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lgo-Russian relations are mired in paradox. For several years, the relationship
tween the Russian Federation on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other
s been characterized by mistrust. As a founding member of these multilateral
ganisations, Belgium has been a full part of the decision-making process that has
rmulated a hardening stance towards the Russian Federation. Yet on a bilateral
vel, Belgium has pragmatically upheld what is left of commercial cooperation and
ltural exchanges. In order to deal with this paradox, Belgium should formulate a
ore coherent approach towards Russia that focuses on upholding the European
der and security whilst maintaining dialogue and engaging the Russian Federation.
is requires the new Belgian government to engage in a delicate balancing act that
n be articulated in the forthcoming National Security Strategy, in the Belgian
sitions in the EU and NATO, and in the bilateral relationship with Moscow. This
mont Paper aspires to provide both analytical background and novel ideas which
n be used to such a purpose.
hen analysing Russian foreign policy, it can only be acknowledged that the annex-
ion of Crimea in 2014 fundamentally challenged the rules-based international
der. Yet to understand Russian behaviour, it is imperative to reach back in time to
e late 1990s and early 2000s. Ever since, Russia’s main goal on the international
age has been the re-establishment of its Great Power status. To this end, it has
ught to consolidate security buffers in the form of geographical and psychological
pth. Most notably, it involved the promotion of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir),
e conduct of operations in the grey zone between war and peace, and a fair dose of2
rategic opportunism. Whilst perhaps understandable, this assertive foreign policy
s negatively affected Belgian interests in a variety of ways.
lgo-Russian relations constitute a true kaleidoscope ranging from cooperation to
nflict. Bilateral trade has largely recovered from the 2014-2015 shock resulting
om the sanctions regime – even if the trade balance remains a negative one.
ltural and academic exchanges continue, in line with the little-known 1993 Belgo-
ssian Treaty on Understanding and Cooperation. Yet politically, conflict has been
 the increase. Russia has been actively challenging and contesting the multilateral
amework that Belgium holds dear. In addition, Belgium has become the target of
ssian disinformation and other grey zone operations. As it is unlikely that Russia
ill tone down its assertive foreign policy anytime soon, Belgium would do well to
ticulate a more coherent approach. This needs to clarify Belgian policy priorities,
mmunicate Belgian positions towards the Russian government, and educate the
mestic audience about the evolving relationship with the Russian Federation. To
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Assume more ownership over multilateral decision-making. Belgium prides
itself on its role as a staunch multilateralist, but often shies away from fully
embracing the consensus reached within the EU and NATO. Yet there can be no
doubt that strength lies in unity with our partners.
Maintain and deepen bilateral relations to enrich the multilateral framework.
The 1993 Belgo-Russian Treaty can provide a sound starting point, assuming
Russia also honours its own commitments contained therein.
Re-develop Russia-related subject matter expertise in Belgium. Over the past
three decades, the study of Russian affairs has atrophied. Yet in the current inter-
national context, it is vital that Belgium re-develops its knowhow of Russian
affairs and foreign policy issues more generally.
Strengthen Belgian domestic resilience to cope with disinformation and a polit-
ical relationship under stress. This includes boosting interdepartmental strategic
communication efforts as well as endowing the public broadcasters with the
mission to inform citizens about the increasingly contested nature of international
affairs.
Explore the question on which basis the EU-Russia economic relationship can be
improved. Any normalization of the economic relationship cannot be anything
but conditional on clear commitments from both the European capitals and
Russia to respect each other’s legitimate security concerns.
Strengthen the Belgian contribution to the collective defence effort. The
mounting criticism from our European allies about the lack of burden-sharing indi-




































Russia (…) is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma;
but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.
~ Winston Churchill
r centuries the relationship between Russia and the West has oscillated between
operation and confrontation. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and the conflict in
stern Ukraine catalysed the deterioration of trust that had already begun with the
08 Five Day War in Georgia, if not earlier (cf. Bossuyt and Van Elsuwege, 2021).
and in hand with this changing trend, a renewed interest in Russia’s increasingly
sertive foreign policy took hold in many Western capitals. Yet somehow, this
ange received remarkably little attention in Belgium – a country historically keen
 maintain good commercial relations whilst avoiding political conflict if possible.
e lack of an articulate Russia policy is both chicken and egg of this lacuna. This
mont Paper seeks to fill this gap by offering a set of reflections on the Belgian
lationship with Russia. These are the product of a working group composed of
dependent academic experts, diplomatic officials and military officers bringing
gether a wide range of Belgian perspectives on a notoriously complicated issue.
lgium’s relations with the Russian Federation are mired in paradox. On a bilateral
vel, Belgium seeks to uphold what is left of commercial cooperation. This is
emplified by the dialogue-enhancing discourse of Belgian politicians towards
ssian officials (Novak, 2017) and the level of imports from Russia flirting once again
ith pre-Crimea levels (Gijsbrechts, 2018). Yet as a founding member of the EU and4
ATO, the country is also a full part of the decision-making process that has formu-
ted a hardening stance towards the Russian Federation. This ranges from the
mping up of EU economic sanctions to military engagement aimed at shoring up
ATO’s collective defence. Moreover, Belgium is by itself a soft target for Russian
sinformation operations. In 2016, Russian officials blamed the Belgian Air Force for
using civilian casualties during an air strike in Syria – an accusation that was quickly
oven to be false. Barely three years later, the Kremlin condemned alleged Franco-
lgian plans to stage a poisonous gas attack. This provided an ill-disguised attempt
 distract attention from Russia’s own bloody involvement in the Syrian conflict.
ese are but a few examples in a long list of Russian efforts aimed at fragmenting
ternational alliances and destabilizing Western democracies. In effect, Belgium
tempts to maintain economic cooperation with Russia whilst at the same time
ing drawn into political conflict.
 order to deal with this paradoxical situation, Belgium should formulate a more
herent approach towards Russia that focuses on upholding the European order
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deration. This requires the new Belgium government to engage in a delicate
lancing act that gets articulated in the forthcoming National Security Strategy, the
lgian position in the EU and NATO and the bilateral relationship with Moscow. This
mont Paper aspires to provide the necessary background and ideas which can be
ed to such a purpose. In the first section, this paper analyses Russian foreign policy
aking, elaborating on its rationale, key features and consequences. The second
rt elaborates on the Belgian paradox, delving into the consequences of Russian
haviour for Belgium, both on a national level as well as within the context of its
embership to NATO and the EU. The third part of the paper outlines a range of







































ceNDERSTANDING RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
ld wine in new barrels
ssia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 fundamentally challenged the rules-based
ternational order. Why is this the case? While the West scrambled for an appro-
iate response, Vladimir Putin proclaimed Crimea’s rightful and long-awaited return
 the Russian Federation (Putin, 2014). Even though this event dramatically illus-
ated the deteriorating bond between the Eurasian giant and the Euro-Atlantic
ther’, relations were already cooling down since the mid-2000s (cf. Trenin, 2006).
e post-Yeltsin Kremlin interpreted and framed the 2004 EU and NATO enlarge-
ents as an infringement on its natural buffer, going against proclaimed (verbal)
omises made by Western leaders in the aftermath of the Cold War. The Colour
volutions in Russia’s Near Abroad in the early 2000s targeted authoritarian
gimes and fraudulent elections but were perceived as a threat by the Kremlin.
dverse to change outside the constitutional framework – and presumably fearing a
ill-over into Russian minds – Putin’s regime portrayed these democratic protests
 Western-fuelled forces trying to undermine Russia’s influence, security and values
utin, 2015a, 2015b). Responding to the membership applications received from
kraine and Georgia, the NATO (2008) Bucharest Summit Declaration stated that
ese countries “will become members of NATO”. This amplified Russian concerns
out geopolitical entrapment. Against this background the EU’s subsequent quest
r an Association Agreement with Ukraine only added insult to injury.
ch frictions between Russia and what the country perceives as ‘the West’ are6
ither new nor unique. Russia has long viewed the West as an ‘Other’. In turn,
estern countries tended to consider Russia as a latecomer to modernity. For centu-
es, the relationship between the two has balanced between cooperation and
nflict, driven by a constant search for security and prosperity on both sides. Tsars
ch as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great took a notorious interest in Western
lture. The Russian Empire sided with Western allies in conflicts such as the Seven
ar’s War (1756-1763), the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. It was no
ranger to ‘Great Power’ treaties such as the Quintuple Alliance (signed in 1818
tween Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia). Yet Russian leaders also
ed with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for centuries. With the Treaty of
est-Litovsk signed in March 1918, Russia’s participation in the First World War
ded early – putting its erstwhile Western allies at risk. The non-aggression pact
gned in August 1939 between Nazi Germany and the USSR set the stage for the
o-front invasion of Poland one month later. After the Second World War, the USSR
wered an Iron Curtain that divided the European continent for almost half a
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he quest for a Great Power status
ssia’s primary goal on the international stage is the re-establishment of its Great
wer status lost after the demise of the Soviet Union. In the mind of Russian
ficials, being respected as a Great Power allows a country to achieve both domestic
ability and international authority. While this goal has not changed since 1992, the
tionale and means have. During the 1990s Russian politicians saw the solution to
is problem mainly in internal reforms. The Chechen Wars aimed to consolidate
ssian territorial unity, economic modernizations stimulated liberalist reforms and
e democratization of the political process was envisioned. Internationally, cooper-
ion and dialogue with the West increased. That the Soviet Union, at that point
ready on the verge of collapse, signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990
 exemplary of the Russian Federation’s initial edging towards the West.
t the economic and political chaos that characterised the reign of Boris Yeltsin – in
rticular from 1993 onwards – raised questions about the viability of such a course.
e first cracks in Russia’s path of integration into the post-Cold War order already
owed with Yevgeni Primakov’s accession as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996.
imakov advocated for his country’s return to the great power game and
ndemned NATO’s eastward expansion.
bles turned further when Vladimir Putin took office in 2000. Shortly after taking
fice, he instructed the drafting of new foreign policy and national security
ncepts, which had been lacking in the 1990s, and the upgrading of Russia’s military
ctrine. During the 2007 Munich Conference, Putin (2007) disregarded “rounda-
ut, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms”. He went on to denounce a unilateral
S-led world order and proclaim that Russia would defend its national interests on7
e international stage. Referring to the “unilateral diktat” of the US and Western
ntainment policies (Putin, 2014), the Kremlin has since framed the West as the
ain barrier between Russia and its Great Power status for more than a decade. This
rategy has allowed the Russian government to externalize all responsibility for the
isting tensions – both in the eyes of its own population and those international
diences that can be made to sympathise with the Russian cause.
e reasons driving Russia’s longing for Great Power status has been the subject of
uch debate. In our analysis, Russia assertively seeks to consolidate security buffers
 the form of both geographical and psychological depth. It perceives both NATO
d the EU as continuously challenging and threatening its historical Near Abroad
d sphere of influence. Geographically, the eastward expansion of the EU and
ATO, and the development of technologically advanced military systems (such as
ecision strike and missile defence capabilities) have caused Russia’s traditional
ffer zone between Western powers and its own territory to collapse. In an attempt
 preserve this protection, the country has embarked not only on military modern-
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ne between war and peace. Disinformation campaigns, the creation of frozen
nflicts in its Near Abroad, cyberattacks and military snap exercises close to the
rders of its neighbours are all part of this strategy. The Zapad-2017 exercise,
hose scenario was based on a conflict between ‘the North’ (i.e., Russia and its
larusian ally) and fictional Western states, was a prime example of Russian muscle
retching and intimidation. Evidence of Russian undersea activity nearby interna-
onal cables also raised serious concern about the security of critical network infra-
ructure (Brzozowski, 2020; Mooney, 2020).
n a psychological level, Russia tries to strengthen its moral boundaries by actively
omoting conservatism, orthodoxy and the idea of a Russian World (Russkiy Mir). In
s 2013 address to the Federal Assembly, Putin (2013) vehemently lamented “the
struction of traditional values” and religious spirituality. The strengthening ties
tween the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church has made the latter a loyal
ly in this strategy. Moreover, incorporating the concept of Russian ‘compatriots’
to official discourse allows the Kremlin to expand these Russian civilizational-natio-
list values beyond its borders. According to Putin (2001), “what matters in the
odern world is not where you live geographically, what matters is your mentality,
ur aspirations and the person’s self-identification.” The Russkiy Mir consequently
compasses all regions where these compatriots may live. He also proclaimed that
ssia has both the right and the means to defend the interests of compatriots.
nsidering the large number of ethnic Russians living in EU member states such as
tvia and Estonia, these concepts are powerful tools in expanding Russian influence.
tin’s intervention in Crimea showed he means business.
 Russian Grand Strategy?8
 would be wrong, however, to think of Russian foreign policy as a one-man master-
an devised by Vladimir Putin. Russia has a knack for ostentatiously demonstrating
 can punch above its weight. This attitude of strategic opportunism stems from a
ismatch between its ambitious political goals, its highly capable security apparatus
d its relatively weak economic position. On the one hand, Russia has been branded
 a power in decline. With oil prices reaching a historic low, an ageing population
d a continuing brain drain, the Russian economy seems to be in its sunset years.
espite being geographically the largest country in the world, its economy in 2019
tuated itself in between that of Italy and Spain in absolute size – although not in
lative purchasing power. Its sphere of influence is shrinking, and the country risks
on becoming the junior partner to China, if it is not already. On the other hand, it
ies to mask its weak position through a plethora of great power displays. This
nges from an extensive modernization of Russia’s nuclear arsenal over snap
ercises and military deployments to cyber and intelligence operations. Most
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rs found to be in material breach of the now defunct INF Treaty obligations (cf.
udenaert, 2019). Furthermore, in a much-vaunted presidential address to the
ssian Federal Assembly, Putin (2018) announced the development of a novel
neration of strategic missile systems, including unlimited-range nuclear cruise
issiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles – aimed at
aking interception all but impossible. In the past two decades, Vladimir Putin has
us played a relatively weak hand very well, skilfully showcasing military ambition
d muscle-flexing as a means to get recognised as a Great Power again (Renz, 2016).
t while his strategy has resulted in some considerable successes, Russia has paid a
gh price by alienating Western countries and thereby accelerating its economic
cline.
ne of the main pillars of Russia’s assertive foreign policy are the so-called grey-zone
erations. Such initiatives aim at exploiting an opponent’s internal divides through
combination of nonmilitary measures, ranging from political and economic to infor-
ational and humanitarian efforts. Preying on the weaknesses of individual
mocratic countries and eroding their collective cohesion, Russia then moves to fill
ese cracks to its own advantage. It either propagates its own version of the truth
 circulates a number of alternative stories to sow confusion and feed conspiracy
eories. The effectiveness of this strategy vis-à-vis the West stems from the
ethora of internal divisions within the EU, NATO and their respective member
ates. On top of this, many Western countries struggle to effectively counter Russian
sinformation – Belgium being a prime example. While initiatives such as EEAS’s
st StratCom Task Force do develop a coherent and factual counternarrative to
ssia’s disinformation campaigns, this only trickles down to the broader public
owly and incrementally. Unlike most EU member states, Belgium does not partici-9
te in the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, for
stance. Although the character of these grey-zone operations has changed, the
ture of this strategy has remained the same for centuries. Even back in the
xteenth century, the first tsar, Ivan IV ‘The Terrible’, exploited the feuds between
zan confederations when fighting in the steppes.
ssia’s vaunted pivot to the East is a prime example of its strategic opportunism.
ssia and China find partners in each other in their focus on territorial integrity and
tional sovereignty, and in their shared hostility towards the Western promotion of
mocracy and human rights. Tightening relations with the People’s Republic of
ina also means Russia has found itself an important ally when it wishes to achieve
s goals in the UN Security Council – such as countering criticism of Russian actions
 Syria and Libya. Against this partnership background, new plans for energy
pelines and defence cooperation have bloomed. The ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline
pplying China with 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year constitutes a case
 point (Gazprom, 2020). Yet Russian racism towards China, Chinese theft of Russian
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nstant pressure on the Sino-Russia relationship. One of the reasons Russia strives
 regain its Great Power status is precisely to counter US hegemony and prevent
ing caught up in a Sino-American world order.
hen looking to the future, it is unlikely that Russia will tone down its assertive
reign policy anytime soon (cf. Saari and Secrieru 2020). Firstly, Russia has tradition-
ly used its foreign policy to boost domestic unity. With Putin’s approval rates
opping, the economy plunging into a recession and domestic protests on the
vernment’s approach to Covid-19 increasing, the Kremlin needs a way to bolster
tional support and boost Putin’s popularity. Secondly, NATO and the EU keep
cussing on the stick-approach, while preserving the carrot for the post-Soviet
ates surrounding the Russian Federation – Ukraine being the prime example. NATO
 responding assertively to Russian missile development, for instance by means of
clear deterrence exercises. At the same time, EU economic sanctions and selective
gagement remain firmly in place. Thirdly, the development of space, cyber and AI
arfighting capabilities continues to put pressure on Russia’s geographic security
ffer, while measures such as the adoption of a resolution on the Molotov-Ribben-
op pact by the European Parliament (2019) target the psychological buffer. The
gic of competition is therefore palpable.
t the same time, Russia’s weak economic position might eventually open opportu-
ties for increasing cooperation. Assuming that Russia can somehow manage to
nvince its European interlocutors of its sincere commitment to respect the security
terests of all EU member states and partners, it is not inconceivable that the EU
uld offer a more attractive future to Russia than it having to accept its de facto
bordination to China. Nevertheless, it is important to remain aware that the
thoritarian character of the Russian regime contrasts with the political system10
bodied in the EU and makes it susceptible to dealing with Beijing. Whilst not
possible, a reset of EU-Russia relations remains a tall order. Fundamentally, the
ux of the matter is whether Russia is truly interested in such a cooperative relation-
ip: its current strategy of preying on the existing divisions within NATO and the EU






































agUSSIA’S IMPACT ON BELGIAN INTERESTS: 
OOPERATIVE PARTNER OR UNDERMINING AGENT?
e key to understanding the Russo-Belgian relationship lies in its paradoxical
ture. With regard to Belgium, the country on the one hand keeps up pragmatic
lateral relations with Russia. These mainly focus on trade, although the country has
ken care to uphold positive relations in a variety of fields – especially before the
imea crisis (Casier, 2013: 124). Yet on the other hand, Belgium is an EU member
ate and a NATO ally. Both international organizations have hardened their stance
wards the Russian Federation in the past decade. As a committed multilateralist,
lgium owns its share in NATO and EU decision-making. Far from being a gesture of
ken solidarity, it is through these organisations that the fundamental principles of
lgian foreign policy get articulated. On the other side of the coin, Russia’s own
radoxical behaviour lies in its antagonistic attitude towards multilateral organisa-
ons and their member states. While it strategically undermines the coherence of
e former by playing on already existing weaknesses and fault lines, the country also
rtures pragmatic bilateral relations with most of their members. The resulting
lgo-Russian relationship thus constitutes a true kaleidoscope: a spectrum of
ements that range from cooperation to conflict.
 small but vital cogwheel in the machinery of international 
rganizations
espite its modest size, Belgium constitutes a soft target for Russian operations. Its11
embership of NATO and the EU, as well as its role as a host to the headquarters of
ese organizations, make the country an inherent part of their policy-making
ocesses. Compared to many other European capital cities, Brussels’ geographical
chpin role in NATO and the EU has thus sparked a more intense political dialogue
ith Moscow (Casier, 2013). In this context, Russia both damages and spares Belgian
terests within the framework of international organizations and on a national level.
hile disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks have aimed at destabilising the
lgian political system and fuelling societal discord, economic trade relations have
ly suffered a relatively mild and time-limited impact from the 2014 EU sanctions
d Russian countersanctions.
iplomatically and politically, Russia has successfully exploited the belated EU-level
sponse to the Covid-19 pandemic, initiating a PR stunt ‘From Russia With Love’ and
nding medical equipment and teams to Italy during the height of the crisis. Italy’s
laxed stance on Russia within the EU and NATO constitutes both cause and conse-
ence of Russia’s attempt to internally divide these organisations by means of
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served that Russian trolls are fuelling societal polarisation on themes such as
igration and Islam (van der Noordaa and van de Ven 2018). It has also been the
rget of high-profile Russian disinformation campaigns in the politico-military
here. The abovementioned cases of alleged Belgian actions in Syria are prime
amples. Not only did the Russian Ministry of Defence falsely accuse Belgium of
using civilian casualties, its spokesperson reacted to the Belgian denials by
plying wilful deception or collusion (RT, 2016). By actively promoting conspiracy
eories, the Russian government showcased it was testing Belgian political
hesion. Even though the issue was quickly set straight in a special session of the
rliamentary committee monitoring foreign missions (cf. De Kamer, 2016: 1-5), it
posed the lack of domestic resilience against disinformation campaigns.
garding military operations, Russia continuously challenges NATO’s defences by
nding Russian bombers and fighter aircraft along the borders of NATO airspace. By
king part in Baltic Air Policing and contributing forces to NATO’s enhanced Forward
esence, the Belgian military frequently operates within range of Russian missile
stems. It is therefore not inconceivable that Belgium could someday find itself
ught up in a military contingency it is hardly prepared for. Just like many other EU
d NATO member states, Belgium is regularly the target of cyber-attacks that have
en all but officially traced back to the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the
lgian government never officially attributed these attacks to Russia, going no
rther than the former minister of Foreign Affairs Didier Reynders commenting on a
reign ministry server breach that “it was a very strong [cyber]attack, probably from
ssia” (Debacker, 2014). By refraining from making official accusations, Belgium
uld avoid pressure to take legal actions against Russia and escalate matters to the
vel of an international dispute. More generally, the problem of attribution in grey12
ne operations constitutes an advantage that Russia gladly capitalizes upon.
n an economic level, Russian influence on Belgian interests within an international
amework is dual. On the one hand, Belgium has supported EU economic sanctions
 the Russian Federation after the seizure of the Crimean Peninsula. On the other
nd, the Russian Federation has imposed its own countersanctions on EU member
ates. In both cases, these have been implemented with mixed success (cf. de Wilde
Estmael, 2015). A ban on the export of pears to Russia could only stop about 50%
 the goods, the remainder being smuggled into Russia via Lithuania and Belarus
urofresh, 2018; Het Belang van Limburg, 2015). Russia also consciously sought to
versify its economy. The Russian milk industry, for instance, has expanded like
pples in a pond since the imposition of the EU sanctions, while Belgian milk farmers
ruggle to sell their surplus production (Medetsky, 2019). As such, the overall
nctions regime has had only a limited effect in changing Russian foreign policy
haviour.
 this day, Russian gas and oil exports remain the key factor defining EU-Russia
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rce debates, especially within the context of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The
verging opinions on the EU’s energy policy create the perfect opportunity for Putin
 drive a wedge between different member states. Despite the Green Deal and the
’s stated aim to strive towards energy diversification and sustainable energy alter-
tives, gas and oil imports from Russia remain an important energy resource during
e transition period (cf. Siddi, 2021). This does not leave Belgium unaffected. Keen
 promote investment security and economic opportunities, Belgium initially vied
ith the Netherlands to promote Antwerp as a gas hub but without success (Casier,
13: 128). More recently, the Belgian LNG infrastructure in Zeebruges did become
 important secondary hub for Russian gas distribution. In 2015, a 20-year contract
as signed with Yamal Trade, providing for the transshipment of up to 8 million
nnes of LNG per year (Fluxys, 2020). However, Belgium’s relatively diversified
ergy imports make it less dependent on Russian gas than many other EU member
ates. As long as this remains the case, it can help mediating the divisive intra-EU
bate over Russian gas imports. At the same time, energy infrastructure often
presents a critical vulnerability when dealing with grey-zone threats (Jonsson,
20).
owards a long-term roadmap
lgium has so far refrained from articulating a coherent policy towards Russia.
rhaps this is unsurprising in the light of Belgium’s frequent domestic political
idlocks and limited interest in foreign affairs. For many years Belgium has lacked an
tegrated foreign policy concept, hampering the prioritization of policy goals and
e reconciliation between political, economic and security interests (cf. Coolsaet,
15). Yet can such a haphazard approach be sustained indefinitely when dealing13
ith a country like Russia, which views power as a zero-sum concept and does not
sitate to leverage all instruments of statecraft? The 2020 Belgian Government
greement signalled that a comprehensive National Security Strategy is to be devel-
ed. This points to a renewed ambition to act as a reliable and predictable partner
 the international scene.
 recent years Belgium has often sought refuge behind EU and NATO decision-
aking. This was not only due to the lack of a national foreign and security policy, but
so due to significant political reluctance to respond to Russian assertiveness
road. In reaction to the Skripal poisoning, for instance, the UK expelled 23 Russian
plomats. Belgium was amongst the countries expelling only one, despite hosting a
ry large Russian diplomatic presence. Whilst the token gesture was perhaps under-
andable in order to avoid Russian retaliation against Belgian interests (and the
all Belgian diplomatic footprint in Moscow), it also showcased how tenuous
lidarity can become – even with a close partner such as the UK – when grey-zone
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litically, the Russian attempts at destabilizing Belgian democracy go further than
ere disinformation campaigns that fuel public discord on controversial issues such
 migration, Islam, and (to a lesser extent) LGBTQI rights. Ties between Russia and
rties on the fringes of the political spectrum – both left and right – are well-known.
uring the Crimea referendum, for instance, three members of the Flemish extreme-
ght political party Vlaams Belang acted as so-called ‘independent observers’ of the
lling stations. Although the individuals reportedly went against the wishes of their
rty’s president, Russia could use their presence to support the legitimation of the
nexation. Similarly, the Workers’ Party of Belgium PVDA-PTB has sought to deflect
e blame for causing humanitarian suffering away from Russia in parliamentary
solutions expressing support for aid to Syria (see e.g. De Vriendt, 2020). This
ggests that the Russian government apparatus is nurturing a network of influence
at can be called upon to obstruct unfavourable decision-making.
n the socio-economic level, however, Belgo-Russian relations remain remarkably
brant. With respect to bilateral trade, imports and exports have largely recovered
om the 2014-2015 shock resulting from the sanctions regime. The trade balance in
ods remains overwhelmingly negative, however, with 3.9 billion EUR of Belgian
ports vs 9.4 billion EUR of imports from Russia in 2017 (Gijsbrechts, 2018). The
ssian company Lukoil is a major investor in Belgian energy infrastructure. Similarly,
ssian diamonds constitute an important source of supply for the Antwerp
amond trade. In 2018, the city of Antwerp organised a mission to Russia to
lebrate friendship ties and attract new investors, for instance (Business Antwerp,
18). With respect to cultural exchanges, the situation is somewhat ambivalent.
ith the support of inter alia the EEAS, the Vladimir Potanin Foundation and the
ssian diamond company Alrosa, the arts centre Bozar maintains a long tradition of14
ltural exchanges (Bozar, 2020).
cademic cooperation between universities is generally positive. From a Russian
rspective, the Russian Federation is interested in developing its academic
treach to Belgium. It is for example the biggest non-EU user of Erasmus+ student
changes. On an institutional level, the government-backed Russkiy Mir Foundation
s sponsored the activities of Russian studies centres at various Belgian universities.
hilst these activities have typically focused on Russia’s rich cultural history, they
ve also provided venues for scouting the Belgian academic landscape and for
aping Russia’s international image. From a Belgian perspective, senior academics
ve tended to encourage exchanges with their Russian counterparts. Belgian
udents, however, seem to be hesitant to travel to Russia due to the country’s
gative image. Between 2015 and 2020, less than one percent of the total number
 KU Leuven exchange students went to Russian universities within the framework
 the Erasmus+ agreements, for instance (Stessens and Vansina, 2020). Last but not
ast, Egmont itself maintains a structural collaboration with the Institute of Europe
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 is also important to mention the framework of values and norms that are cherished
 Belgian civil society. While our country prides itself on its active propagation of
man rights, multilateralism and the rule of law, we also maintain bilateral relations
ith countries that do not adhere to these values. Even when Belgium vocally
nounces the violation of human rights, this may not bring about the change that is
sired. Especially in the case of a negative trade balance, Belgium consumption
tually helps sustaining authoritarian regimes. Naturally, this is not a call for
spending commercial relations with all non-democratic countries. Rather, it is a
ll to think about the world we want, how Belgium can contribute to this, and what
licy Belgium should carry out towards the Russian Federation, both nationally and
ithin the framework of EU and NATO. It is arguably only in such a framework that a
ore coherent policy can be articulated.
hen reflecting on Russo-Belgian bilateral relations, it is worth remembering the
93 Treaty on Understanding and Cooperation between the Kingdom of Belgium
d the Russian Federation (Verdrag / Traité, 1998). Signed only two years after the
ssolution of the Soviet Union, this document aspired to cement friendly relations
d outlined a comprehensive programme for developing the bilateral relationship
a biennial Shared Action Plans. Whilst the treaty remains in place thanks to the
lent extension clause codified in Article 16, formal initiatives to update the cooper-
ion roadmap have dried up in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Military-to-
ilitary contacts are now quasi non-existent, for instance, and overall diplomatic
ust is low. This leaves observers to wonder whether the aspirations underlying this
eaty can still be reinvigorated, or whether the treaty should be formally termi-
ted, as many of its obligations – such as those pertaining to the CFE Treaty – have











HAT BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A BELGIAN RUSSIA 
OLICY
 long-term policy towards Russia needs to clarify what are the Belgian policy prior-
ies, communicate Belgian positions towards the Russian government, and educate
e domestic audience about the evolving relationship with the Russian Federation.
rticulating such a policy would be no mean feat for the incoming Belgian govern-
ent led by Alexander De Croo. To nurture the reflection process about such a policy
cument, a number of building blocks can nonetheless be identified.
Assume more ownership over multilateral decision-making. Belgium prides
itself on its role as a staunch multilateralist, but often shies away from fully
embracing the consensus reached within the EU and NATO, and in particular the
unpalatable consequences thereof. Yet there can be no doubt that strength lies
in unity with our partners: this is precisely what dealing with Russia requires. As
such, the EU and NATO consensus cannot be sacrificed in the pursuit of short-
sighted commercial advantage. The Belgian Government Agreement’s explicit
confirmation that “NATO remains the cornerstone of Europe’s collective
defence” constitutes an important signal that the country will stand by its allies
in any collective defence contingency and use all necessary means to do so. As
the Government Agreement has put a new emphasis on arms control, Belgium
can use its position as consensus-seeking country to turn around (or at least miti-
gate) the erosion of the arms control architecture resulting from the suspension
of the INF Treaty and the oncoming expiration of New START in 2021. The Organ-
ization for Security and Co-operation in Europe serves as a natural forum for16
discussing what a stable, cooperative and mutually respectful relationship with
Russia could look like. In this regard Belgium can build on the experience gath-
ered during its 2018 chairmanship of the OSCE Structured Dialogue.
Maintain and deepen bilateral relations to enrich the multilateral framework.
The 1967 Harmel report, in which the former Belgian minister of Foreign Affairs
Pierre Harmel introduced the dual-track policy of deterrence and détente, can
provide a source of inspiration in this context. Each Ally was encouraged to play
its part in improving (bilateral) relations with the Soviet Union and the countries
of Eastern Europe whilst also bearing the unity and solidarity of the Alliance in
mind. In line with the philosophy of the Harmel doctrine, Belgium could reinstate
the importance of bilateral relations with the Russian Federation as mechanisms
to enrich EU and NATO decision-making. Open and frank discussions – including
on Russia’s concerns about the political architecture of the European continent –
cannot be avoided. The Belgo-Russian action programme that used to feature in
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Russia also honours its own commitments contained therein. This includes
thinking about opportunities to reach out not only to all relevant governmental
authorities, but also beyond, i.e. to Russian business circles and civil society.
Cultural and academic exchanges can take place on the principles of artistic and
academic freedom whilst showcasing the traditions and sensitivities of both
sides.
Re-develop Russia-related subject matter expertise in Belgium. Over the past
three decades, the study of Russian affairs has atrophied. This has resulted in a
drainage of knowhow on Russia and the post-Soviet sphere in academic, policy
and political circles. This trend continued even after the annexation of Crimea, as
attested for instance by the decision to abolish the Slavistics programme at the
KU Leuven (cf. Defoort et al., 2016). Yet in the current international context, it
remains vital that Belgium re-develops its knowhow of Russian affairs and foreign
policy issues more generally. This can be done via the active engagement of poli-
ticians, diplomats, military officials and academics in international Russia-related
networks, investing in centres of Russian knowledge, and bolstering public
interest in news media.
Strengthen Belgian domestic resilience to cope with disinformation and a polit-
ical relationship under stress. The nefarious activities of the Russian Federation
in the information domain are well-documented, but public awareness thereof
remains scarce. In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, for instance, Belgian State
Security has investigated propaganda disseminated by various foreign powers
and concluded that such propaganda mainly originates from Russia (VSSE, 2020:
8). Unified governmental responses to disinformation operations, easy access to
trustworthy information and general awareness-raising about the competitive17
landscape of the modern information environment are in order. This includes
boosting interdepartmental strategic communication efforts as well as endowing
the public broadcasters with the mission to inform citizens about the increasingly
contested nature of international affairs. Initiatives such as EUvsDisinfo, the flag-
ship project of the EEAS East StratCom Task Force, or the Estonian Propastop blog
could serve as examples. Another measure would be for Belgium to formally join
the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid threats.
Explore the question on which basis the EU-Russia economic relationship can be
improved. There is little point in damaging the remaining commercial relations
further if sanctions are proven to be an ineffective instrument in changing
Russian behaviour – especially now that both the EU and the Russian Federation
are hard-pressed to respond to the COVID19-induced economic shock. When
considering sanctions, a thorough cost-benefit analysis should be made before
deciding on either sector-based collective or Magnitsky-type individual sanctions
– especially considering the peculiar character of the Russian regime. At the same
time, any normalization of the economic relationship cannot be anything but
•
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conditional on clear commitments from both the European capitals and Russia to
respect each other’s legitimate security concerns. Such a discussion – both within
the EU and between the EU and Russia – would be a worthwhile diplomatic
undertaking. Meanwhile, prudence about bilateral trade ties being leveraged for
achieving political advantage is in order. With respect to critical infrastructure
(such as energy and digital networks in particular), vigilance about network integ-
rity remains paramount.
Strengthen the Belgian contribution to the collective defence effort. In the
absence of major breakthroughs, the relationship between the Russia Federation
and the Euro-Atlantic institutions and their member states will remain a difficult
one over the long haul. The fundamental question for Belgium is whether its
present position with respect to collective defence – with its national contribu-
tion being limited to air policing, nuclear sharing and largely token contributions
to the enhanced Forward Presence – is sufficient. The mounting criticism from
our European allies about the lack of burden-sharing indicates that more efforts
will be needed in sustaining deterrence. If Belgium wants to stop the erosion of
its own diplomatic voice and uphold the rules-based order, it is imperative to
invest in the different instruments of statecraft – from development cooperation
over the diplomatic network to defence. The fact that Russia respects military
power and despises weakness only adds to this importance. Improving the read-
iness of the Belgian armed forces is therefore key – not only for expeditionary
operations in the European southern neighbourhood, but also for more
demanding missions along NATO’s eastern flank. In this context, the re-introduc-
tion of a Ground-based Air Defence system is well-warranted. The wider chal-
lenge will be to ensure the full interoperability of the Belgian Motorised Brigade18

































hile the distance between Moscow and Brussels measures some 2500 km, there
e good reasons to consider the relationship with Russia of central importance in
e development of the future Belgian National Security strategy. In a material sense,
e Russian Federation remains the only state posing a direct and potentially existen-
al threat to the European political order as we know it – including both the territo-
al integrity and economic well-being of EU member states and NATO allies alike.
en when Belgium chooses to treat Russia with respect, Brussels can still respect-
lly disagree with Moscow over a plethora of issues. These range from the
idespread instability plaguing the Eastern neighbourhood and the Middle East to
e future of the European political order itself. Without neglecting the importance
 other critical international dossiers, such as the future of global trade, the rise of
ina and the management of the post-COVID19 aftermath, the paradoxical nature
 Belgo-Russian relations and the many questions it engenders need to be tackled.
is Egmont Paper has sought to provide the conceptual building blocks for articu-
ting a new Belgian policy towards Russia. This requires honing our understanding
 Russia’s foreign policy objectives as well as of Belgium’s own bilateral and multi-
teral interests relating to Russia. It also entails a delicate balancing act of arbitrating
tween competing policy priorities. Yet Belgium can build on many strengths. These
clude most notably its role as consensus-seeking linchpin in both the EU and NATO.
 addition, the 1993 Belgo-Russian Treaty has already created a framework for
epening bilateral outreach. This can be revamped as well as reconsidered:
timately this depends on the willingness of both parties to deliver on their respec-19
ve commitments. Possibilities for nourishing the bilateral relationship in order to
hance mutual understanding do exist. Yet in order to engage in such bilateral
alogue in the first place, the toolkit of Belgian foreign policy instruments and its
cietal resilience need to be strengthened. Larger questions such as the future of
-Russia economic relations and the evolution of NATO’s deterrence posture may
ways lurk in the background, yet to participate in these debates Belgium needs a
ear understanding of its own role in the world. It is to that fundamental purpose
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